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The Shifting Use of the So-Remote-as-
to-be-Negligible Standard for Qualified 
Conservation Contributions 
  
Ashley H. Waterbury* 
Abstract 
 
Qualified conservation contributions, also known as 
conservation easements, have become a subject of close scrutiny 
under the Internal Revenue Service within the past decade. One 
reason for such scrutiny is that conditions are being imposed on 
these contributions, testing the perpetuity requirement for 
conservation easement deductions. In order for a condition on the 
donation to survive, the condition must be “so remote as to be 
negligible.” The judicial interpretation of the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard has fluctuated since its addition to the 
Treasury Regulations in 1939. Most recently, the Tax Court in 
Graev v. Commissioner, explored the meaning of the so-remote-
as-to-be-negligible standard outside of the traditional 
grantor/grantee relationship by assessing the likelihood of IRS 
action. By denying the deduction in Graev, the Tax Court 
highlighted that a condition based on IRS action, namely the 
allowance of a deduction, should not be a permissible condition 
for qualified conservation contributions. This Note will argue that 
further clarification of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard 
should be included in the Treasury Regulations. In particular, 
conditions based on the IRS allowance of a deduction should be 
explicitly barred from consideration under the so-remote-as-to-be-
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 In 1980, Congress passed section 170(h) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“Code”), creating the current qualified 
conservation contribution structure.1 A qualified conservation 
contribution is defined as “a qualified real property interest to a 
qualified organization exclusively for conservation purposes,” and 
is commonly known as a conservation easement.2  In allowing 
                                                 
1. See Act of Dec. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-541, 94 Stat. 3204 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (2014)) (allowing qualified 
conservation easement deductions, but only if the easements meet one of three 
exceptions). 
2. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., 
OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-2-05, 
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deductions for donations of conservation easements, Congress 
wanted to create incentives for landowners to preserve 
environmentally and historically important property.3 Since then, 
conservation easements have become a source of donations 
resulting in large deductions.4 For example, from 2003–2006, the 
average value of a donated conservation easement was $491,068, 
making conservation easements the highest valued per-donation 
value by over $300,000.5 As conservation easements amounted to 
such large deductions, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 
raised concerns over conservation easement deductions.6 IRS 
Notice 2004-41 alerted donors that the IRS might issue penalties 
for improper use of the deduction.7 Improper uses have included 
inflated valuation of the easement, not creating an easement in 
perpetuity, and requests to return easements after the donation 
has already been made.8  
 This Note will specifically address one aspect of the 
perpetuity requirement for conservation easements. While 
                                                                                                                 
at 277 (Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE], 
available at http://www.jct.gov/s-2-05.pdf (defining qualified conservation 
contribution) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
3. See S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 9 (1980) (explaining that the 
Senate wanted to expand deductions for conservation easements in recognition 
of the “important role” easements play to further conservation goals). 
4. See Josh Eagle, Notional Generosity: Explaining Charitable 
Donors’ High Willingness to Part with Conservation Easements, 35 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 47, 48 (2011) (“Americans give away easements in enormously valuable 
chunks in comparison to other kinds of real and personal property.”). 
5. See id. at 49 (providing a graph which illustrates the contrast 
between the high value of qualified conservation easement donations and other 
donations). 
6. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, 2004-28 I.R.B. 31, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/n2004_41.pdf (addressing awareness of the 
improper use of charitable contribution deductions for conservation easements 
and an intention to penalties for such improper deductions) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
7. See id. (“[I]n appropriate cases, the Service intends to disallow 
such deductions and may impose penalties and excise taxes.”). 
8. See Steven T. Miller, Comm’r, Tax Exempt and Government 
Entities, Internal Revenue Serv., Remarks Before the Land Trust Alliance 
Public Spring Public Lands Conference (March 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/tax-matters/rules/remarks-of-steven-t.-
miller-march-2006 (addressing the current issues with charitable contributions 
of conservation easements) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 




conservation easements generally must exist in perpetuity, the 
Treasury Regulations allow for the consideration of a remote 
future event in conservation easement deeds.9 These remote 
future events will not violate the perpetuity requirement so long 
as the likelihood of the event occurring is “so remote as to be 
negligible.”10 This standard originated in the estate tax 
provisions, but it has been applied in federal income tax law since 
1959.11 The regulations themselves do not further clarify the 
standard.12 Hence, the task of articulating the level of remoteness 
requisite for the standard has been left to case law.13  
 A recent Tax Court case, Graev v. Comissioner, 
interpreted the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard in the 
context of a façade easement.14 In Graev, the grantee provided a 
side letter separate from the conservation easement agreement 
whereby it agreed to refund the easement to the taxpayer grantor 
if the IRS disallowed a deduction for the grantor.15 The Tax Court 
held that this side letter created a condition of a remote future 
event on the easement and that the likelihood of this event was 
                                                 
9. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-1(e), -7(a)(3), -14(g)(3) (2014) 
(addressing the issue of conditions based on the occurrence of future events). 
10. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-1(e), -7(a)(3), -14(g)(3) (2014) 
(allowing deductions for conservation easements which have conditions on 
remote future events as long as these future events are “so remote as to be 
negligible”). 
11. See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 389 (2013) (providing a 
history of Treas. Reg. §1.170A-1(e)).  
12. See Satullo v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697, 6 (1993) (“The 
regulations offer no specific guidance for determining whether a possibility of 
occurrence is so remote as to be negligible . . . .”). 
13. See id. (explaining that the regulations do not define the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard, so the standard is defined through case 
law).  
14. See Graev, 140 T.C. at 377–78 (“The question now before the 
Court is whether deductions for Mr. Graev’s contributions of cash and the 
easement to NAT [National Architectural Trust] should be disallowed because 
they were conditional gifts. The answer depends on whether . . . the chance that 
the condition would occur was ‘so remote as to be negligible.’”).  Façade 
easements are a type of conservation easement which preserve historic 
properties. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FAÇADE EASEMENT CONTRIBUTIONS, 
FAÇADE EASEMENT BRIEF (Aug. 2009). 
15. See Graev, 140 T.C. at 383 (describing the contents of the side 
letter). 
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more than negligible.16 This holding raises questions as to how 
the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard should be applied, as 
well as how taxpayers are to prepare for successful conservation 
easement deductions.17 
 The goal of this Note is to evaluate the evolution of the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard, particularly as a result of its 
use in Graev. To begin, Part II will discuss the details of the 
Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations, which allow 
for conservation easements. Following that, Part III will examine 
prior case law using the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard 
and address how its definition has changed. With that 
background, Part IV will then address the Graev case in detail, 
discussing the oddities of the case. In particular, it will highlight 
the grantor’s use of a condition solely for tax purposes. Lastly, 
Part V will discuss the future of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard in light of Graev.  
This Note recommends that the Treasury promulgate 
regulations to further define the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard. The current definitions developed by case law are 
overly broad and allow for conditions that do not primarily serve 
the purpose of conservation.18 Grantors of qualified conservation 
easements should not be permitted to include “tax insurance” 
clauses along with their donations.19 Rather, these donations 
should be irrevocable on tax deductibility grounds. The ability to 
                                                 
16. See id. at 398 (explaining that the issuance of the side letter 
“implies a non-negligible risk”). 
17. See Michelle L. Vesole, Listen to the Warnings: Contingent 
Charitable Contribution Deduction is Disallowed, BLOOMBERG BNA ESTATE TAX 
BLOG (July 18, 2013), http://www.bna.com/listen-warnings-contingent-
b17179875304/ (highlighting the tension between the Graev holding and the 
application of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
18. See Timothy L. Jacobs, Kaufman—Another Sad Chapter in the 
Service’s Assault on Façade Easements, TAXATION OF EXEMPTS, July/August 
2014, at 16 (2014), http://www.hunton.com/files/Publication/8956f103-d3ea-4468-
b4d5-a6ecba26f4b7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cd2aa9de-5188-470a-
8e2b-780e318ec2df/Kaufman_Another_Sad-
Chapter_In_The_Services_Assault_On_Facade_Easements.pdf (illustrating how 
cases in the area of façade easements are unpredictable in the wake of Graev 
and subsequent cases) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
19. I would like to thank Professor Brant Hellwig for the 




refund conservation easement donations suggests that the 
donation is being made solely for tax benefits, as opposed to 
conservation purposes.20 These tax driven donations are the ones 
most likely to lead to aggressive valuation, one of the biggest 
issues with conservation easements today.21 Disqualifying 
conditions that allow refunds upon a denial of a deduction attack 
what could be considered the most aggressive conservation 
easement transactions.22  
 
II. The Code and Regulations on the Qualified Conservation 
Easement Deduction 
 
A. The Code 
 
 Section 170(a) of the Code provides a deduction for any 
charitable contribution.23 Yet, this general rule of allowance is 
subject to a host of conditions.24 One such restriction, section 
170(f)(3), applies to partial interests in property.25 Initially, one 
would think that a conservation easement would be disallowed 
because it is a partial interest in property; it is an agreement 
between the landowner and the holder of the easement to restrict 
use on the property, and it does not provide any other ownership 
                                                 
20. See Remarks of Steven T. Miller, supra note 8 (highlighting 
situations where taxpayers petition for the return of the easement they donated 
upon discovering that the tax credit they received was not marketable). 
21. See Theodore S. Sims, Qualified Conservation Restrictions: 
Recollections of and Reflections on the Origins of Section 170(h), 33 UTAH ENVTL. 
L. REV. 41, 57 (2013) (explaining the widespread propensity for conservation 
easements to be valued “aggressively”). 
22. See id. at 58 (illustrating a proposed system that makes 
disclosure of the deduction amount a prerequisite to claiming a deduction and 
acknowledging that such a system “could by itself function as a deterrent to the 
most egregiously aggressive positions, by substantially simplifying the process 
of detection and reducing the costs of enforcement.”) 
23. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2014) (“There shall be allowed as a 
deduction any charitable contribution . . . payment of which is made within the 
taxable year.”). 
24. See I.R.C. § 170(f) (2014) (providing for “disallowance of 
deductions in certain cases,” as well as providing other “special rules”). 
25. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(3) (2014) (allowing deductions for 
contributions of partial interests in property “only to the extent that the value of 
the interest contributed would be allowable as a deduction under this section if 
such interest had been transferred in trust”). 
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rights.26 Section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), however, provides an exception 
to the partial interest rule, allowing a deduction for “a qualified 
conservation contribution.”27 Conservation easements fall into 
this category.28 
 The Code provides a definition in section 170(h) for a 
qualified conservation contribution: it must be a contribution of 
(1) a “qualified real property interest,” 2) “to a qualified 
organization,” and (3) “exclusively for conservation purposes.”29 A 
“qualified property interest” includes a conservation easement 
because it is “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use 
which may be made on the real property.”30 Common grantees of 
conservation easements, charities and non-profit organizations, 
meet the requirements for a “qualified organization.”31 
Conservation easements will meet the “exclusively for 
conservation purposes” requirement as long as the “conservation 
purpose is protected in perpetuity.”32 Thus, in order to qualify for 
a deduction on one’s conservation easement, two perpetuity 
requirements must be met: (1) the easement must be granted in 
perpetuity, and (2) the purpose of the easement must remain in 
perpetuity.33 This dual requirement highlights the priority of 
                                                 
26.  See Eagle, supra note 4, at 53 (quoting Nancy A. McLauglin, 
The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38 
IDAHO L. REV. 453, 453 (2002)) (defining conservation easements).  
27. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2014) (allowing an exception to the 
general rule for deductions for qualified conservation contributions). 
28. See OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 2, at 277 
(placing conservation easements into the category of qualified conservation 
contributions). 
29. I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(A)–(C) (2014). 
30. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2014) (defining qualified real 
property interests). 
31. See OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 2, at 277 
(“Qualified organizations include certain governmental units, public charities 
that meet certain public support tests, and certain supporting organizations.”); 
I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (2014) (defining “qualified organization”); I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) 
(2014) (outlining types of organizations to which individuals may make 
deductible charitable contributions). 
32. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (2014) (requiring the conservation 
easement to be protected in perpetuity in order to qualify as “exclusively for 
conservation purposes”).  
33. See Ann Taylor Schwing, Perpetuity is Forever, Almost Always: 
Why it is Wrong to Promote Amendment and Termination of Perpetual 
Conservation Easements, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 217, 221 (2013) (explaining 




perpetuity when seeking to qualify for a deductible conservation 
contribution.34 Perpetuity is crucial for donations of conservation 
easements because it makes the easement holder’s use restriction 
enforceable against others.35 Without perpetuity, the use and 
purpose of the property could change easily, giving no value to 
the easement itself.36  
 
B. Treasury Regulations 
 
The statute does not address how perpetuity is defined for 
charitable contributions.37 Rather, that issue is left to 
administrative guidance.38 The Treasury Regulations do not 
insist on absolute perpetuity.39 Instead, the regulations allow for 
consideration of a remote future event in the conservation 
agreement, so long as that remote future event is so remote as to 
be negligible.40 The regulations use this terminology three times: 
                                                 
34. See id. at 243 (explaining that “[t]he whole purpose of a 
conservation easement is to remain binding despite changes in circumstances, 
such as enhanced profitability of land for development.”). 
35. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 
170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for Federally Subsidized Conservation 
Easements, Part I: The Standards, 45 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L. J. 473, 482 
(2010)  (noting that the perpetuity requirement allows the conservation purpose 
to be protected against all other parties in interest, including successors in 
interest). 
36. See Jessica E. Jay, When Perpetual is Not Forever: The 
Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual 
Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (explaining that 
perpetual conditions restricting the use of land “protect[s] conservation values”).  
37. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-1(e), -7(a)(3), -14(g)(3) (2014) 
(requiring the use of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard, but not defining 
it).  
38. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing and Amending Tax-
Deductible Conservation Easements: Protecting the Federal Investment after 
Carpenter, Simmons, and Kaufman, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 217, 290–92 (2012) 
(noting the IRS’s “helpful”, but still inadequate, guidance of the perpetuity 
standard through the issuance of information letters). 
39. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(g)(1)–(3) (2014) (indicating that 
the possibility of a so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard contemplates the fact 
that absolute perpetuity is not required). 
40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(e) (describing situations when 
conditions dependent upon future events are allowed). 
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(1) to apply to conditional transfers,41 (2) to apply to contributions 
of partial interests in property,42 and (3) to apply to conservation 
easements specifically.43 All three regulations require that the 
standard be applied at the time the gift is made.44 Outside of this, 
there is no other guidance from the regulations on how to apply 
this standard or how it is defined.45 Because of this, the courts’ 
application and definition of the standard have changed over 
time.46 It also allowed for the grantor in Graev v. Commissioner to 
attempt to include a refund condition dependent on the allowance 
of a tax deduction.47  
 
III. The Case Law Development of the So-Remote-as-to-be-
Negligible Standard 
 
A. Estate Tax Origins 
 
Use of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard first 
appeared in the estate tax regulations in 1939 for conditional 
                                                 
41. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(e) (2014) (“If as of the date of a gift 
a transfer for charitable purposes is dependent upon the performance of some 
act or the happening of a precedent event . . . no deduction is allowable unless 
the possibility that the charitable transfer will not become effective is so remote 
as to be negligible.” (emphasis added)). 
42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(a)(3) (2014) (“A deduction shall not 
be disallowed under section 170(f)(3)(A) and this section” because of  an event 
happening so long as “if on the date of the gift it appears that that the 
possibility that such act or event will occur is so remote as to be negligible”). 
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(3) (2014) (“A deduction shall not 
be disallowed under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) and this section merely because the 
interest which passes to, or is vested in, the donee organization may be defeated 
by the performance of some act of the happening of some event, if on the date of 
the gift it appears that the possibility that such act or event will occur is so 
remote as to be negligible.”). 
44. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-1(e), -7(a)(3), -14(g)(3) (2014) 
(requiring that the condition be assessed on the “date of the gift”).  
45. See Satullo v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697, 6 (1993) 
(acknowledging no guidance exists for the application of the standard, but also 
noting that there is no need for the court to provide any at this time because it 
is clear from the facts that likelihood of event was more than negligible). 
46. See McLaughlin, supra note 38, at 225–29 (2012) (outlining 
various courts’ struggle to determine the standard and implications of the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard). 
47. See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 385 (2013) (quoting the 




charitable deductions.48 Early cases interpreted the regulations  
to state that a deduction would be disallowed if the possibility the 
charity would not take was more than so remote as to be 
negligible.49 These regulations shifted the focus of evaluation onto 
the likelihood of the charity taking in light of the other facts and 
circumstances, including each devise related to the condition.50 
The ultimate decision of whether the condition would be allowed 
rested on whether the charity would be able to take upon 
operation of the condition.51  
 
1. Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger 
 
The Supreme Court first interpreted the so-remote-as-to-
be-negligible standard in 1955 in Commissioner v. Estate of 
Sternberger.52 In Sternberger, the decedent left a wife (62 years 
old) and daughter (27 years old) surviving him.53 Under the terms 
of his will, if his daughter died without descendants surviving her 
or her mother, then a charitable bequest would be made.54 At the 
time of decedent’s death, the daughter was divorced and had no 
                                                 
48. See Treas. Reg. § 81.46(a) (1949) (stating that for estate tax 
purposes, if there is a conditional transfer to a charity, “no deduction is 
allowable unless the possibility that charity will not take is so remote as to be 
negligible”); see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b)(1) (2014) (stating that 
deductions for charitable transfers are not “allowable unless the possibility that 
the charitable transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be 
negligible”); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 
1005, 1012 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (explaining the adoption of the 1949 regulation 
into the current regulations).  
49. See Hamilton Nat’l Bank, 236 F. Supp. 1005, 1012 (“To be 
entitled to a charitable deduction prior to 1939 in the case of a transfer to a 
charity subject to a condition, the estate had to prove that it was impossible for 
the charity not to take.”)   
50. See id. at 1012–13 (outlining the evolution of the interpretive 
shift in focus). 
51. See id. at 1010 (requiring a finding that the charity’s 
remainder interest in a decedent’s estate be capable of valuation, proving that 
the charity would take). 
52. See Comm’r v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 194 (1955) 
(describing estate tax regulations before the allowance of conditions for remote 
future events under the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard). 
53. See id. at 188 (providing background information on the 
decedent’s surviving heirs).  
54. See id. (describing the terms of the testamentary trust).  
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children.55 The executor of the decedent’s estate made a deduction 
for the charitable bequest, and assumed that the daughter would 
not have any children.56 The Commissioner disallowed the 
deduction, and the estate petitioned the Tax Court to determine 
whether the possibility a charity would not take under the 
decedent’s will was so remote as to be negligible.57 The Tax Court 
reversed the Commissioner’s determination.58 The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, and the case then went 
to the Supreme Court.59 This Supreme Court opinion was the 
first to define the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard 
originally promulgated in 1939.60  
Keeping in mind that prior to 1939, the regulations did not 
allow for conditional donations,61 the Court defined so remote as 
to be negligible to be “negligible” or “highly improbable.”62 The 
Court imposed this high level of scrutiny because it did not want 
a condition which prevented the charity from taking, but still 
allowed the taxpayer to get a deduction.63 The Court in 
Sternberger focused the application of the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard on the grantee/charity, instead of the grantor: 
the grantor may be able to give, but it was important that the 
                                                 
55. See id. (describing factors which would affect the decedent’s 
daughter receiving the residuary estate). 
56. See id. at 188–90 (describing the actions of the executor of the 
estate).  
57. See id. at 188–93 (presenting the procedural history and issue 
of the case). 
58. See id. at 189 (describing the Tax Court’s treatment of the 
case).  
59. See id. (describing the Second Circuit’s treatment of the case).  
60. See id. at 195–99 (noting that a similar issue arose in Humes v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 487 (1928), but it was not specifically interpreting the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard because it had not yet been 
promulgated). 
61. See id. at 194 (“The predecessor of § 81.46 confined charitable 
deductions to outright, unconditional bequests to charity.”); see also Hamilton 
Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 1005, 1012 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1965) (discussing that the “so remote as to be negligible” language did not 
become a part of the charitable contribution deduction regulations until 1939).  
62. See Comm’r v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 194 (1955) 
(“Section 81.46(a) today yields to no condition unless the possibility that charity 
will not take is ‘negligible’ or ‘highly improbable.’”). 
63. See id. (reiterating that the encouragement of bequests to 




grantee had the opportunity to take.64  The Court evaluated the 
ability of the charity to take based on the self-interest of the 
daughter to remarry.65 If the daughter did remarry, then the 
condition affording the charity the opportunity to take would not 
occur.66 The Court calculated that she would have a “$2,000,000 
inducement to remarry.”67 The Court deviated from evaluating 
satisfaction of the condition solely through actuarial tables, 
suggesting that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard should 
be evaluated through more subjective factors related to the 
parties involved in the transaction.68  
Sternberger also emphasized that the charity must take 
fully in order to get the deduction; the amount of the deduction 
cannot be based on the proportional likelihood of the charity 
taking.69 The so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard is an all or 
nothing requirement.70 If a condition’s occurrence would inhibit 
the grantee’s ability to take but is nonetheless so remote as to be 
negligible, then the deduction is still allowed.71 Ultimately, the 
deduction in Sternberger was disallowed because the possibility 
that the charity would not take was more than negligible.72  
                                                 
64. See id. at 193 (emphasizing that the focus of the so-remote-as-
to-be-negligible test is on whether the charity is truly assured the grantor’s 
bequest).   
65. See id. at 198 (noting under the terms of the will, the daughter 
had a $2,000,000 incentive to remarry and have children). 
66. See id. at 188 (providing the terms of the trust). 
67. See id. at 198 (explaining the daughter’s incentive to remarry, 
illustrating that the chances the charity won’t take are not very remote). 
68. See id. (noting that the actuarial tables become less 
dependable to the extent a person can defeat a condition of the charity taking). 
69. See id. at 199 (“This Court finds no statutory authority for the 
deduction from a gross estate of any percentage of a conditional bequest to 
charity where there is no assurance that charity will receive the bequest or 
some determinable part of it.”). 
70. See id. (“Where the amount of a bequest to charity has not 
been determinable, the deduction properly has been denied.”).  
71.  See id. (“Where the amount has been determinable, the 
deduction has, with equal propriety, been allowed where the designated charity 
has been sure to benefit from it.”). 
72.  See id. at 199 (disallowing the deduction because the charity 
had a more than negligible chance of not receiving the bequest). 
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This case set the stage for future definitions and 
applications of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard.73 Not 
only did it define the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard as 
“negligible” or “highly improbable”, but it also addressed how and 
to whom the standard would be applied.74  According to the 
Sternberger Court, the focus should be on the grantee/charity and 
the likelihood of the condition occurring should be evaluated 
through subjective factors, not just actuarial tables.75  
 
2. United States v. Dean 
 
Shortly after Sternberger, the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit further addressed how the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard should be defined.76 In United States v. Dean, 
the decedent’s estate would make bequests to charity if the 
decedent’s sister, age 82 at the time of the decedent’s death, 
survived the decedent’s daughter, age 67, and daughter-in-law, 
age 68.77 Using actuarial tables, the court provided the likelihood 
of the sister surviving the daughters was one in eleven.78 
Ultimately the court held the likelihood of the sister surviving 
was not so remote as to be negligible and disallowed the 
deduction.79 
                                                 
73.  See U.S. v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 29 (1st. Cir. 1955) (explaining 
the Sternberger analysis and using Sternberger as a basis for the Court’s own 
analysis). 
74. See Comm’r v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 193–94 
(1955) (defining so-remote-as-to-be-negligible and explaining that the focus of 
the standard is on the grantee’s odds of taking). 
75.  See id. at 194, 198 (explaining that the focus of the so-remote-
as-to-be-negligible is on the grantee’s chance of taking and placing more weight 
on subjective factors than less reliable actuarial tables).  
76. See Dean, 224 F.2d at 29 (applying the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard). 
77. See id. at 27 (providing the terms of the condition on the 
testamentary gift).  
78. See id. (calculating the likelihood that the 82-year-old woman 
would survive the 67- and 68-year-old women). 





The court in Dean acknowledged the difficulty of 
articulating when a condition is so remote as to be negligible.80 
Because of this inability to draw lines, the court suggested 
applying the standard on a case-by-case basis.81 During this case-
by-case evaluation, a court must only consider Congress’s intent 
to encourage testators to give to charities.82 Applying this 
suggested analysis, the Dean court compared the facts in 
Sternberger to those in Dean.83 It found the element of volition to 
be the main distinction between the two conditions.84 In 
Sternberger, the element of volition was that the donation to 
charity would not be made if the decedent’s daughter remarried 
and left issue.85 The condition in Dean, however, was contingent 
upon the longevity of a person, which the court said has no 
volitional element.86 The court reasoned that this lack of volition 
allowed the court to rely more on statistical evidence, like 
actuarial tables.87  
The Dean court also attempted to provide its own 
definition for the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard.88 
Warning that its definition is subjective, the court defined “so 
remote as to be negligible” to mean “a chance which persons 
generally would disregard as so highly improbable that it might 
                                                 
80. See id. (“The line between those chances which are so remote 
as to be negligible and those which are not lies somewhere between these 
extremes. We cannot say exactly where.”). 
81. See id. (endorsing the evaluation of cases individually to see 
whether a condition is so remote as to be negligible).  
82. See id. (“And there is no standard to guide us except our 
estimate of the extent of the encouragement tax-wise which Congress wished to 
give testators to make gifts to charity.”). 
83.  See id. at 28 (“. . . the Sternberger case [does not] rule this one, 
for here the chance that charity will take does not depend upon the probability 
of anyone having issue, a matter involving an element of volition.”). 
84. See id. (comparing the evaluation of the condition in 
Sternberger with the facts in Dean).  
85. See id. (distinguishing the Dean condition from the Sternberger 
condition); see also Comm’r v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 197–98 
(1955) (discussing the “inducement to remarry”). 
86. See Dean, 224 F.2d at 28 (“In this case the chance that charity 
will benefit depends entirely upon the relative longevity of three persons, a 
matter unaffected by volition or personal inducement . . . .”). 
87. See id. (noting that in this case “statistical data is not subject 
to distortion by any individual’s self-interest”). 
88. See id. at 29 (defining the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard).  
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be ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious 
business transaction.”89 This definition does raise the question, 
however, of why a condition would exist in the agreement, if it 
could reasonably and safely be ignored in a business transaction? 
Despite this irony, this definition based on a propensity to ignore 
or dismiss is applied in several other cases dealing with the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard.90  
 
3. Estate of Woodworth v. Commissioner 
 
The Tax Court in Estate of Woodworth v. Commissioner 
supplied a slightly different definition of the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard to supplement the Dean definition.91 The 
Woodworth court defined the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard as: “a chance which every dictate of reason and common 
sense would justify an intelligent person in disregarding as so 
highly improbable and remote as to be lacking in reason and 
substance.”92  Like the Dean definition, this definition raises the 
question as to why the condition would exist in the agreement if 
it is “so highly improbable” to occur.  
The decedent in Woodworth directed her trustees to use 
her estate to build a hospital in Spartanburg, South Carolina, 
where no hospital currently existed.93 This term implied that she 
did not imagine a condition where the hospital would not exist.94 
The direct instruction to establish the hospital would create the 
                                                 
89. See id. (emphasizing the high improbability that is required to 
meet the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard).  
90.  See, e.g., Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. United 
States, 236 F. Supp. 1005, 1016 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (defining the so-remote-as-to-
be negligible standard to include a chance “so highly improbable that it might be 
ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction”); 
Estate of Woodworth v. Comm’r, 47 T.C. 193, 197 (1966) (defining the standard 
based on what an intelligent person could disregard as being so highly 
improbable that it lacks any substance).  
91. See Woodworth, 47 T.C. at 197 (comparing the court’s 
definition in Dean to the definition provided by the Tax Court).  
92. Id.  
93. See id. at 195 (presenting a condition of the trust).  





charity that could take the gift.95 When the co-executors of the 
decedent’s estate filed the estate tax return, they claimed a 
charitable deduction for the amount in the trust allocated for the 
establishment of the hospital.96 The Commissioner filed a notice 
of deficiency however because “it has not been shown that there 
has been or will be an effective transfer of funds” to establish the 
hospital.97 So in Woodworth, the condition depended upon 
whether a hospital would actually be established in 
Spartanburg.98 The court found the possibility of no hospital was 
more than negligible, because the charity itself (the hospital) had 
not yet been established.99  
The implied condition requiring the actual establishment 
of the hospital necessitated an application of the so-remote-as-to-
be-negligible standard.100 The previous cases examined thus far 
included express conditions.101  With this introduction of implied 
conditions, the court provided a new definition for the so-remote-
as-to-be-negligible standard, based on high improbability, and so 
“remote as to be lacking in reason and substance.”102 
Interestingly, the court also noted “there is nothing absolute or 
certain with respect to the fact that a Catholic hospital might or 
might not come into existence and, therefore, is not so remote as 
to be negligible.”103 This emphasis on certainty seems to 
                                                 
95  See id. (explaining that the donation would be an 
unconditional gift to help in building a Catholic hospital in Spartanburg). 
96.  See id. at 195 (discussing the executor’s action in response to 
the terms of the trust).  
97. See id. (explaining the reasoning of the Commissioner when he 
issued a notice of deficiency against the estate).  
98. See id. at 195–96 (“[S]ince the trustees could not use the fund 
for purposes other than those stated in the will and until steps were taken to 
establish a Catholic hospital, the fund would lie idle and for the use of no one.”). 
99. See id. at 196 (discussing why the condition did not meet the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard).  
100. See id. (establishing that if the bequest is conditional the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard is applied). 
101.  See Comm’r v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 188 (1955) 
(noting the express condition in the will that must be met before the charitable 
donation transfers); see also United States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 27 (1st. Cir. 
1955) (explaining the express condition in the decedent’s will). 
102. See Woodworth, 47 T.C. at 197 (defining the so-remote-as-to-
be-negligible standard).  
103. See id. (noting the uncertainty of the hospital ever actually 
coming into existence). 
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contradict the court’s earlier statements that the so-remote-as-to-
be-negligible standard is associated with high improbability.104 
The court in Woodworth was the first to raise the idea of 
certainty when evaluating with the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard.105 It was the lack of certainty here which caused the 
denial of the deduction.106 Yet, if an outcome is uncertain, like the 
establishment of a hospital, does it not create a lesser likelihood 
of it occurring? The court’s emphasis on lack of certainty confuses 
the prior applications of the standard seen in Sternberger and 
Dean.107 In those cases, there was not a focus on certainty, but 
rather a focus on the types of factors which may influence the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible evaluation, like the likelihood of the 
charity/grantee taking, and whether an element of volition is 
required in order to meet the condition.108 The actual text of the 
definition of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard offered in 
                                                 
104.  See id. (including improbability in the definition of the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard). 
105. See id. at 197–98 (evaluating the charitable deduction based 
on a lack of certainty that the hospital would ever be built or that a fund would 
ever be created to do so). 
106. See id. at 196 (“Thus the bequest had no semblance of 
certainty unless action was taken to establish either a hospital or a fund to 
build one.”).  
107. See Comm’r v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 194 (1955) 
(“Section 81.46(a) today yields to no condition unless the possibility that charity 
will not take is ‘negligible’ or ‘highly improbable.’”); see also United States v. 
Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 29 (1st. Cir. 1955) (defining the standard to mean “a chance 
which persons generally would disregard as so highly improbable that it might 
be ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business 
transaction”). 
108. See Sternberger, 348 U.S. at 194, 198 (explaining that the focus 
of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible is on the grantee’s chance of taking and 
other subjective factors); see also Dean, 224 F.2d at 28 (discussing the role of 




Woodworth,109 however, is similar to the definition in Dean.110 
The application of the standard is where they differ.111  
 
4. Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga v. United States 
 
 Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga v. United States 
sheds light both on the history of the definition of the so-remote-
as-to-be-negligible standard and its application.112 In contrast to 
Woodworth, it emphasized that the standard should not rely on 
precision or certainty.113  
The decedent in Hamilton left his son a life interest in a 
testamentary trust.114 Upon the son’s death, one-fourth of the 
trust corpus was to go to the issue of his son, and the other three-
fourths were to go to designated charities, and the trust would 
terminate.115 The decedent’s son died two years after his father 
with no surviving issue.116 The trustee filed an estate tax return 
after the son’s death, claiming a deduction for charitable 
contributions, but the Commissioner assessed a deficiency 
against the trustee, claiming the possibility of the son having 
issue after the death of his father did not meet the so-remote-as-
to-be-negligible standard.117 The court held in favor of the trustee, 
                                                 
109. See Woodworth, 47 T.C. at 197 (defining the so-remote-as-to-
be-negligible standard as  “a likewise chance which every dictate of reason and 
common sense would justify an intelligent person in disregarding as so highly 
improbable and remotes as to be lacking in reason and substance”). 
110. See Dean, 224 F.2d at 29 (defining the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard as “a chance which persons generally would disregard as so 
highly improbable that it might be ignored with reasonable safety in 
undertaking a serious business transaction”). 
111. See Woodworth, 47 T.C. at 197–98 (denying the charitable 
deduction based on an analysis that focused on the certainty of a condition being 
met). 
112. See Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. United States, 236 
F. Supp. 1005, 1012–14 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (discussing the history and use of the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard). 
113. See id. at 1014 (stating that the standard is not met by 
showing impossibility, but rather negligible possibility). 
114. See id. at 1006–07 (providing the terms of the trust).  
115. See id. at 1007 (describing the condition subsequent of the 
trust).  
116. See id. (describing the absence of issue at the son’s death).   
117. See id. (describing the actions of the trustee, and the 
Commissioner in response, after the son’s death).  
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stating the condition was so remote as to be negligible based on 
testimony from doctors who had examined the son and said that 
he suffered from cancer and would have a shorter life 
expectancy.118 
The Government in this case tried to argue that the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard really meant impossibility.119 
The government argued impossibility because it was an earlier 
standard used before the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard 
was included in the regulations.120 It also applied a definition 
from a 1935 case, where impossibility was defined as a “negligible 
chance of not vesting.”121 The court in Hamilton did not accept 
the Government’s reasoning.122 Considering the Sternberger case, 
the court noted that the impossibility argument did not arise in 
the Supreme Court.123 Additionally, it provided its own logic to 
explain why impossibility and so remote as to be negligible are 
not the same thing: “[w]hile ‘impossibility’ and ‘no possibility’ 
may be accurate synonyms, and while ‘impossibility’ and 
‘possibility’ may be accurate antonyms, ‘negligible possibility’ is 
not an accurate synonym of either.”124  
The Government also tried to argue that in order to meet 
the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard, there must be some 
“precise predictability” with the condition to determine if it is so 
remote as to be negligible.125 This followed the Woodworth 
                                                 
118. See id. at 1017 (explaining that the likelihood of the son having 
issue was so remote as to be negligible and providing reasons for this 
evaluation). 
119. See id. at 1012 (contending the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard to be equivalent to the former impossibility test used before the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible language was included in the regulations).  
120. See id. (citing case law decided before the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard was promulgated which defined impossibility as “a 
‘negligible’ chance of not vesting”). 
121. See id.  (citing City Bank Farmers’ Trust Co. v. United States, 
74 F.2d 692 (C.A.2d 1935), for this definition of impossibility).  
122. See id. at 1014 (asserting that the court does not “interpret 
pre-1939 cases relied upon by the Government as defining ‘impossibility’ to 
mean ‘possibility . . . so remote as to be negligible’”).  
123. See id. at 1013 (“This Court does not interpret the Sternberger 
case as holding that ‘possibility . . . so remote as to be negligible’ is the same as 
‘impossibility.’”).  
124. See id. at 1014 (explaining why impossibility and so-remote-as-
to-be-negligible cannot be applied as the same standard).  




emphasis on certainty about the completion of the hospital, as 
well as other cases that used actuarial tables to quantify the 
condition.126 However, the Hamilton court rejected this 
correlation.127 Instead it explained that the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard operates independently of any precise 
predictability because it would make the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard rather useless.128 The predictability itself 
would negate the possibility of some condition being so remote as 
to be negligible.129 
 The court in Hamilton also presented a third possible 
definition for “so remote as to be negligible:” 
 
A negligible possibility is a possibility that would in 
the ordinary and reasonable affairs of men be 
disregarded in arriving at a present valuation of a 
future remainder interest in a serious business 
transaction, with no reduction in the value of the 
remainder interest being made by reason and the 
existence of such possibility.130  
 
This definition, in comparison to the others offered in Sternberger 
and Dean, emphasized valuation as a factor when reviewing the 
condition.131 Additionally, the Hamilton court clarified that 
impossibility does not define the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard.132 All definitions provided thus far incorporated some 
element of reasonable dismissal from the parties involved in 
                                                 
126. See id. (noting the other cases that the Government relied on 
for its argument that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard had to show 
precise  predictability). 
127. See id. at 1011 (rejecting the use of “presently ascertainable” 
when evaluating under the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard).  
128. See id. (“If the survival or non-survival of issue is ‘precisely 
predictable’ or even ‘reliably predictable’ then it is either clearly possible or 
clearly impossible, in which event ‘negligible possibility’ becomes meaningless.”).  
129. See id. (providing an additional reason as to why the use of 
precise predictability is not appropriate when applying the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard).  
130. Id. at 1016. 
131.  See id. (noting the importance of the present valuation in 
defining the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard).  
132. See id. at 1014 (emphasizing that impossibility is not the same 
as possibility so remote as to be negligible).  
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drafting the terms of the condition.133  A drafting party would 
have no reason to include a condition if the occurrence of the 
condition was so remote as to be negligible. This subsequently 
raises the question of when an express condition would ever meet 
the standard. Expressing the condition implies that the drafting 
parties thought it was reasonable to include it in the agreement.  
These three definitions (Sternberger, Dean/Woodworth, and 
Hamilton) provided the background for defining the so-remote-as-
to-be-negligible standard in the federal income tax context for 
qualified conservation contributions.134 
 
B. Federal Income Tax Cases 
 
Even though the Treasury Regulations did not allow for 
deductions for conservation easements until 1980,135 they 
included the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard for other 
charitable donations reliant on conditions.136 These cases, and 
those specifically addressing conservation easements, developed 
the definitions and applications of the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard and set the background leading into Graev v. 
Commissioner.137  
                                                 
133. See id. at 1016 (defining the standard to mean a reasonable 
disregard of the condition in a contract or transaction because the chances of the 
condition happening are so remote); Estate of Woodworth v. Comm’r, 47 T.C. 
193, 197 (1966) (defining the standard to mean reasonable disregard of the 
condition); U.S. v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 29 (1st. Cir. 1955) (defining the standard 
to mean reasonable disregard of the condition); Comm’r v. Estate of Sternberger, 
348 U.S. 187, 194 (1955) (defining the standard to mean “negligible” or “highly 
improbable”). 
134.  See Briggs v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 646, 656–57 (1979) (citing many 
of these cases in the estate tax context as instructive for federal income tax 
cases). 
135. See Act of Dec. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-541, 94 Stat. 3204 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (2014)) (allowing deductions for 
conservation easements).  
136.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(e) (1972) (utilizing the so-remote-
as-to-be-negligible standard for conditional charitable donations); Treas. Reg. § 
1.170A-7(a)(3) (1972) (stating that deductions are not disallowed simply because 
of the conditional nature of the donation because of the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard). 
137.  See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 390–94 (2013) (referencing 




1. Early Cases Addressing the So-Remote-as-to-be-Negligible 
Standard 
 
a) Briggs v. Commissioner 
 
One of the earliest federal income tax cases to address the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard was Briggs v. 
Commissioner.138 This 1979 case did not deal specifically with 
conservation easements, but rather with a donation of land in fee 
simple subject to a condition subsequent.139 If the condition was 
not met, the original landowner would have right of reentry or 
the power to terminate the donation.140 The condition was that 
property would be donated to a group of Native Americans to be 
used for establishment of a cultural, educational, and medical 
center.141  
The Briggs court evaluated the donation of the land under 
the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard used in section 
1.170A-1(e).142 It defined the standard with the definitions seen 
in the estate tax cases above, including both the Dean and 
Sternberger definitions.143 The court evaluated the condition 
based on the reasonableness of the grantor and grantee’s 
actions.144  
In this case especially, the court examined possibility of 
satisfying the condition through the grantor and grantee’s 
interests and their ability to sustain the goal of the condition: to 
                                                 
138. See Briggs, 72 T.C. at 656–57 (1979) (considering the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard in the federal income tax context)). 
139. See id. at 655 (explaining that the petitioner’s gift contained a 
condition subsequent).  
140. See id. (“Petitioner has the right of reentry or power of 
termination if the condition is broken.”). 
141. See id. at 649 (explaining the terms of the condition).  
142. See id. at 653 (applying the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard found in section 1.170A-1(e)).  
143. See id. at 656–57 (providing estate tax background on the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard).  
144. See id. at 657–58 (applying the Dean and Woodworth definition 
to the grantor’s and grantee’s reasonable ability to maintain and protect the 
easement).  
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build a cultural, educational, and medical center.145 With respect 
to the grantor, the court emphasized that the grantor did little to 
ensure that the center would be built on the property: it provided 
no funds for the creation of the center, and when the gift was 
made, no form of financing was available.146 Turning to the 
grantees, the court found they possessed no experience in 
fundraising or receiving grants.147 With this review, the court 
held that the likelihood of the condition being left unsatisfied was 
more than so remote as to be negligible.148 Along with both 
parties lacking the business acumen to establish a center, the 
court asserted that the petitioner had the intention to take back 
the property if the condition was not satisfied.149 It also predicted 
that the grantee would easily dissolve if it had difficulty 
satisfying the condition.150  So the court, in reviewing the 
likelihood of the condition, looked at the financial and managerial 
acumen of the parties, as well as their intentions.151 
 
b) 885 Investment Co. v. Commissioner 
 
Another major Tax Court case to address charitable 
contribution deductions was 885 Investment Co. v. 
                                                 
145. See id. at 656–59 (addressing the terms of the condition and 
the grantor and grantee’s ability to fulfill the request to establish a cultural, 
educational, and medical center).  
146. See id. at 657 (“[P]etitioner did not provide funds for the 
establishment of the center, and at the time the gift was made, no 
financing . . . was readily available. . . . Petitioner failed to produce any new 
evidence that funds to establish the center were forthcoming; there was a good 
chance that the center might never come into existence.”).  
147. See id. at 658 (describing the lack of business and managerial 
experience for the individuals acting on behalf of the grantee).  
148. See id. (“We conclude, however, that on the date of the gift 
there was more than a negligible possibility that the desires of the board of 
directors [for the grantee] might become frustrated by the conditions 
imposed . . . .”). 
149. See id. at 656 (“If ANIOFI [grantee] failed to use the ranch for 
the establishment of the center, petitioner [grantor] intended to retake the land 
and hold out for another group which was willing and able to establish the 
center.”). 
150. See id. at 658 (predicting the ANIOFI board of directions may 
dissolve if unable to carry out condition).  
151. See id. at 656–59 (assessing both the grantor’s and grantee’s 




Commissioner.152 The taxpayer wanted to donate a portion of its 
property to the city of Sacramento to develop a scenic corridor.153 
It donated with the expectation that it would not have to 
maintain or develop the property.154 Aware of this expectation, 
the city included a condition into the agreement.155 If the city 
were unable to get the funding from the state to maintain and 
develop the highway, the property would be returned to 
taxpayer.156 The fact that the grantee, rather than the grantor 
imposed the condition is unique.157 The Tax Court found the 
grantee-imposed condition significant.158  
Like the Briggs case, the court applied the so-remote-as-
to-be-negligible definitions from Dean and Woodworth.159 
Ultimately, the court held that the condition was not so remote as 
to be negligible.160 Resting its reasoning on the fact that the 
grantee had asked for the condition,161 the court saw this as 
evidence of a “realistic possibility” that the property would be 
                                                 
152. See 885 Inv. Co. v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 156 (1990) (considering the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard in the context of a charitable 
contribution). 
153. See id. at 158 (presenting the facts of the case). 
154. See id. (“885 offered to donate to the city that portion of land 
within its scenic corridor; the donation was based upon 885’s understanding 
that it would not have the responsibility for developing and maintaining the 
scenic corridor.”). 
155. See id. at 159 (describing the condition which the grantee 
requested to have in the agreement).  
156. See id. at 159, 161 (describing how the condition allows for the 
grantee to revert the property back to the owner if the property is not used for a 
scenic corridor).  
157.  See id. at 159 (explaining that the city required the provision 
to potentially deed the property back to the grantor). 
158.  See id. at 162 (placing weight in the fact that the city put in 
this provision as an indication that the return of the property wasn’t so remote 
as to be negligible). 
159. See id. at 161–62 (defining the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard as they were used in Dean and Woodworth).  
160. See id. at 162 (asserting the possibility of the property being 
returned to the grantors was not so remote as to be negligible).  
161. See id. (“The city insisted that 885 accept the return of the 
property if the city could not use it as a scenic corridor. . . [I]n light of the 
financial and legal uncertainties the city harbored, [this] is a clear indication 
that the return of the donated property to 885 was not so remote as to be 
negligible.”). 
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returned.162 As addressed earlier in the Dean case, the insertion 
of these conditions, which are cautionary of future events, 
ultimately provide a tipping point for the “so remote as to be 
negligible” analysis.163 Because the standard is defined as “highly 
improbable,” the fact alone that a condition was included based 
on a future event seems to set up the conditional contribution 
deduction for failure.164 
Both Briggs and 885 Investment Co. introduce new 
approaches to applying the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard.165 The Briggs court not only evaluated whether the 
grantee would be able to take, but also whether the grantor was 
committed to carrying out the condition.166 This deviates from the 
original purpose for the standard seen in the estate tax cases; the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard was implemented to 
prevent grantors from receiving deductions even if the 
grantee/charity did not take.167 The 885 Investment Co. court 
highlighted that the grantee asked for the condition.168 This 
request, in comparison to a grantor’s inclusion of a condition, 
seemed to further sway the court into finding that the condition 
did not meet the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard.169 The 
                                                 
162. See id. (analyzing the city’s lack of funds in addition to its 
request for the condition to establish that the likelihood of the property being 
returned to 855 was more than negligible).   
163.  See id. at 162 (saying that the fact that the city was dependent 
on funding and included these provisions proved that the reversion was not 
“remote”). 
164.  See id. at 161 (defining “highly improbable” as a circumstance 
in which the ordinary businessperson would not consider the occurrence as a 
possibility of the deal). 
165.  See id. at 162 (evaluating the intent of the grantee in adding a 
condition in order to determine whether the standard is met); see also Briggs v. 
Comm’r, 72 T.C. 646, 656–59 (1979) (looking at financial and managerial 
acumen of the parties, as well as their intentions). 
166. See Briggs, 72 T.C. at 654 (evaluating whether the grantor’s 
ability to take a reversionary interest in the donated property was actually “so 
remote so as to be negligible”). 
167. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text (explaining the 
original purpose behind the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard).  
168. See 885 Inv. Co. v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 156, 161 (1990) (stating 
that the “so remote as to be negligible” standard could not be applied if a 
reversion to the grantor was not actually remote).  
169. See id. at 162 (stating that the grantee’s request that the 
reversion clause be included meant that the grantee could foresee the donation 




grantee’s act represented a more intentional desire to include the 
condition.170 This pulled the condition further away from the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible requirement that a future event be so 
improbable that no reasonable party would consider it.171  
 
2. Case Law on Conservation Easements and the So-Remote-
as-to-be-Negligible Standard 
 
a) Commissioner v. Simmons 
 
Unlike what was seen in Briggs and 885 Investment Co., 
in Commissioner v. Simmons, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the conditional qualified conservation easement 
deduction met the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard, and 
allowed the deduction.172 In this case, the grantor donated two 
façade easements to L’Enfant Trust (grantee), a tax-exempt 
organization in Washington, D.C. dedicated to historic 
preservation.173 The easement agreements included a clause 
allowing the grantee to abandon or make changes to the 
easements.174 The Commissioner argued this clause violated the 
perpetuity requirement under section 170(h)(5).175 The D.C. 
Circuit rejected the Commissioner’s position.176 
The court held the change and abandonment clause did 
not violate the perpetuity requirement, but rather created a 
                                                 
170.  See id. (providing the fact that the grantee may have foreseen 
the property reverting back to the grantor when they requested the condition’s 
inclusion). 
171.  See id. (explaining that the fact that the condition was 
included by the grantee made the reversion possible).  
172. See Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6, 10–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(explaining why the right to abandon does not obviate the satisfaction of 
perpetuity and still allows the easement to stand up against the so-remote-as-
to-be-negligible standard).  
173. See id. at 8 (providing factual background).  
174. See id. (“The deeds allow L’Enfant ‘to give its consent—e.g., to 
changes in a Façade—or to abandon some or all of its rights thereunder.”). 
175. See id. at 9 (describing the Commissioner’s arguments).  
176. See id. at 10 (“We conclude the easements meet the 
requirement of perpetuity in § 170(h)(5)(A).”). 
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safety net for the grantee.177 If a change ever arose where the 
grantee would need to alter the property (i.e. to have people live 
there), the clause would allow for those changes while still 
permitting the grantee to maintain as much of the conservation 
purpose as possible.178 The court also noted any grantee may fail 
on its obligation regardless of the abandonment clause seen 
here.179 The court even specifically acknowledged that the 
grantee (L’Enfant) could abandon its rights altogether, but based 
on its prior practice, it was so remote as to be negligible that the 
grantee would do so.180 The court also cited D.C. historic 
preservation laws, stating the laws bound the grantee of the 
conservation easement and allowed for the grantor’s easement to 
be protected.181 
In addition to reaching a different conclusion, the D.C. 
Circuit in Simmons applied the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard in a different manner.182 The court cited neither the 
Dean nor the Sternberger definition.183 Instead it simply defined 
the standard as a “remote possibility.”184 In its analysis, the court 
put considerable weight into the reputation of the grantee, but 
barely discussed the grantor in the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
breakdown.185 The fact that there was only a change and 
abandonment clause on the conservation easement seems to be 
what allowed the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible argument to 
                                                 
177. See id. (“The clauses permitting consent and abandonment, 
upon which the Commissioner so heavily relies, have no discrete effect upon the 
perpetuity of easements  . . . .”).  
178. See id. (asserting that change and abandonment clauses can 
aid in maintaining the overall conservation purposes).  
179. See id. (explaining that abandonment does not just occur as a 
result of a clause which allows it). 
180. See id. (“L'Enfant has been holding and monitoring easements 
in the District of Columbia since 1978, yet the Commissioner points to not a 
single instance of its having abandoned its right to enforce.”). 
181. See id. (describing the role D.C. historic preservation law plays 
in conservation easements).  
182.  See id. (requiring that any donated land must be subject to a 
perpetuity requirement for both the donor and the donee).  
183.  See id. (outlining the fact that the donated land must remain 
consistent with conservation purposes specified in the Code). 
184. See id. at 10–11 (defining the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard).  
185. See id. at 10–12 (upholding the deduction based on the 




succeed.186 Both the reputation of the grantee and the supportive 
D.C. laws for historic preservation played a role in making any 
implied condition from the change and abandonment clause 
condition a remote possibility.187  
 
V. Graev v. Commissioner, an Overview 
 
In June 2013, the Tax Court issued its opinion on Graev v. 
Commissioner.188 It held that a façade conservation easement 
donation was not tax deductible because the donation included a 
side letter creating a conditional gift.189 The condition in the side 
letter allowed the grantee to return the grantor’s easement 
donation if the IRS decided that the donation was not 
deductible.190 The possibility of this condition arising was found 
to be more than so remote as to be negligible.191 
The court applied the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard to the IRS, a party outside of the immediate 
grantor/grantee relationship.192 The condition itself rested on the 
decision of the IRS, and guaranteed that the conservation 
easement agreement would dissolve should the deduction be 
denied.193 This reliance on an outside third party, along with a 
condition that allows for an unraveling of the whole agreement, 
encourages aggressive use of qualified conservation 
contributions.194 A condition centered solely around tax 
deductions, and allowing for a refund if the deduction is denied, 
                                                 
186.  See id. at 11 (stating that the “remote possibility” that donated 
property would be returned to the donee would not disallow the deduction). 
187.  See id. at 10–11 (noting the grantee’s interest in preserving the 
easement for conservation purposes and highlighting that even if the grantee 
dissolved, the easements will be transferred to another conservation 
organization). 
188. See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377 (2013). 
189. See id. at 409 (denying the deduction because the side letter 
established  a condition which was not so remote as to be negligible).  
190. See id. at 383 (describing the contents of the side letter). 
191. See id. at 409 (arguing the side letter did not meet the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard).  
192.  See id. at 394–95 (analyzing the likelihood of the IRS to 
disallow the deduction).  
193. See id. at 383 (providing the terms of the condition).  
194.  See Sims, supra note 21, at 59 (stating the process of allowing 
“before” and “after” valuations for contributions encourages valuations that do 
not adequately reflect the fair market value of the donation). 
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encourages aggressive valuation.195 Graev demonstrates that this 
type of “tax insurance” clause for conservation easements should 
not be permitted because it does not perpetuate any greater 
conservation purpose. These conditions only cater to the concerns 
of the grantor. In light of the Graev outcome, conservation 




The National Architectural Trust (“NAT”) reached out to 
Mr. Graev in the summer of 2004 and asked if he would be 
interested in donating a façade easement on one of his historic 
properties in New York City.196 Mr. Graev responded, expressing 
interest, but also concern because his accountants had alerted 
him of a recent IRS Notice that warned of “penalties and excise 
taxes” to those who make improper conservation easement 
donations.197 NAT assured Mr. Graev that the IRS Notice would 
not apply to the type198 of conservation easement donations that 
NAT offered.199 NAT even told Mr. Graev that it had been in 
contact with the IRS and that it had “no reasons to expect that 
[NAT] or any of the donations [NAT] has received (easement or 
cash) w[ould] be reviewed.”200 
                                                 
195.  See id. at 58 (requiring that the deduction amount taken must 
match the amount of valuation on the return in order to promote the public 
interest). 
196. See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 381 (2013) (describing 
NAT’s solicitation of Mr. Graev).  
197. See id. at 8 (describing Mr. Graev’s concern as a result of the 
IRS Notice); see also IRS Notice 2004-41, supra note 6 (alerting taxpayers that 
abusive use of qualified conservation contributions could lead to penalties and 
excise taxes). 
198. The IRS highlights two main types of problematic qualified 
conservation easements: (1) those that do not serve a valid public purpose or 
those where donor receives a greater financial benefit from the easement than 
the public, and (2) easements donated to charitable organizations where there 
charity in turn sells the easement for profit. See IRS Notice 2004-41, supra note 
6 (addressing current issues with qualified conservation contributions).  
199. See Graev, 140 T.C. at 382 (providing NAT’s assurances to Mr. 
Graev that his type of donation was not addressed in the IRS Notice). 
200. See id. at 382–83 (contrasting NAT activities with those 




Around this time, Mr. Graev also requested a “side letter” 
from NAT.201 He had neighbors who had donated façade 
easements to NAT and had received these letters as a part of 
NAT’s standard policy.202 NAT supplied him with a side letter 
which guaranteed: “In the event the IRS disallows the tax 
deduction in their entirety, we will promptly refund your entire 
cash endowment contribution and join with you to immediately 
remove the façade conservation easement from your property’s 
title.”203 The conservation easement deed did not include the 
promise made in this side letter.204 
A few months after Mr. Graev had donated his easement 
to NAT, NAT contacted Mr. Graev to tell him that the Senate 
Committee on Finance planned to implement reforms on 
deductions for façade easements.205 Several months after that, 
NAT wrote Mr. Graev again, telling him that the “refund offer” in 
the side letter might adversely impact the deductibility of his 
donation and that he should seek tax advice on the refund 
offer.206 NAT also offered to rescind the refund offer to potentially 
preserve the deductibility of the easement.207 Mr. Graev chose not 
to withdraw the refund.208 The facts in the case did not elaborate 
as to why Mr. Graev chose not to withdraw.209  
                                                 
201. See id. at 383 (highlighting when Mr. Graev submitted his 
façade easement application to NAT, he also requested NAT write him a side 
letter emphasizing the standard NAT policy that there will be a refund if the 
donor’s deduction is disallowed).  
202. See id. (“In a cover letter to NAT transmitting the application, 
Mr. Graev stated: ‘I will also be looking or the NAT to issue the ‘side’ letter we 
discussed (similar to the one being issued to my neighbors across the street).’”). 
203. See id. (providing the text of NAT’s side letter to Mr. Graev).  
204. See id. at 385 (“The deed did not expressly refer to the side 
letter or incorporate its terms.”). 
205. See id. at 386 (describing NAT’s first communication to Mr. 
Graev after his donation that the Senate Committee on Finance planned to look 
in depth at the valuation of façade easements).  
206. See id. (describing NAT’s second communication to Mr. Graev 
after his donation which warned him that the side letter’s refund offer may 
“adversely affect the deductibility of the cash contribution as a charitable gift”). 
207. See id. (“Of course, if you determine that you would prefer that 
we withdraw the refund offer, which according to our attorney should restore 
the deductibility of your cash contribution, the Trust will promptly do so.”). 
208. See id. (noting that Mr. Graev chose not to withdraw the 
refund).  
209. See id (showing that such evidence is not included in the 
record). 
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This case arose in the Tax Court because Mr. Graev and 
his wife claimed deductions on the conservation easement 
donation.210 The IRS issued a notice of deficiency to the Graevs 
arguing “the noncash charitable contribution of a qualified 
conservation contribution is disallowed because it was made 
subject to subsequent event(s).”211 The issue before the Tax Court 
was whether Mr. Graev’s contributions to NAT would be 
deductible because they were conditional gifts.212 
 
B. Tax Court’s Opinion 
 
The Tax Court found in favor of the Commissioner, 
holding that the side letter created a conditional gift, whose 
condition was more than so remote as to be negligible.213 The 
court began its opinion by stating the law which qualifies Mr. 
Graev’s donation as a conservation contribution, including the 
three regulations which address the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard.214  
In addition to including the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
definitions seen in Dean and Briggs (citing Woodworth), the court 
also emphasized the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible analysis should 
be made in light of “all the facts and circumstances.”215 This 
suggests an expansion from what had been seen in earlier cases 
where the analysis rested heavily on the actions and intentions of 
the grantee and grantor only.216 In fact, the Graev court began its 
                                                 
210. See id. at 386–87 (explaining why the IRS issued a notice of 
deficiency against the Graevs). 
211. Id. at 387.  
212. See id. (“The question now before the Court is whether 
deductions for Mr. Graev’s contributions of cash and the easement to NAT 
should be disallowed because they were conditional gifts.”). 
213. See id. at 409 (“[W]e conclude that at the time of Mr. Graev’s 
contributions to NAT, the possibility that the IRS would disallow the Graev’s 
deductions for the contributions and, as a result, that NAT would promptly 
refund Mr. Graev . . . was not ‘so remote as to be negligible.’”). 
214. See id. at 387, 393 (explaining Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-1(e), -
7(a)(3), -14(g)(3) and why they are relevant to Mr. Graev’s case).  
215. See id. at 394 (presenting prior case law definitions of the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard and adding that “all facts and 
circumstances” should be considered).  
216. See id. (adding “all facts and circumstances” to the analysis of 




so-remote-as-to-be-negligible analysis with the IRS’s likelihood of 
disallowing the deduction and its intention to scrutinize 
conservation easements more closely.217 By beginning its analysis 
with the IRS’s actions and intentions, the court suggested the 
grantor and grantee are not the only parties who influence the 
determination of whether a condition is so remote as to be 
negligible.218 
The court quickly noted that “it is self-evident that the 
risk of IRS disallowance was not negligible.”219 The court 
explained that Mr. Graev clearly foresaw the issue of 
deductibility, and that is why he requested the side letter.220 Mr. 
Graev’s actions did not fit in to the traditional definition of so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible that establishes a standard of 
disregarding or ignoring the possibility of the condition 
occurring.221 Mr. Graev foresaw this issue of deductibility because 
he was aware of the increased IRS scrutiny on conservation 
easement contributions, from both the IRS Notice and the letters 
from NAT.222 While the IRS Notice did not specifically address 
the type of contribution Mr. Graev made, the court explained that 
the notice served to alert all grantors and grantees of qualified 
conservation contributions of the IRS’s heightened scrutiny.223 
Mr. Graev’s initial email to NAT about the notice also supported 
the assertion that the IRS Notice applied to others outside of the 
specific examples the IRS cited.224 
The side letter, instead of the conservation easement 
agreement, ended up being what activated the application of the 
                                                 
217. See id. (discussing the possibility that the IRS will disallow the 
deduction). 
218. See id. (highlighting the potential for the IRS to disallow the 
deduction and for NAT to return the easement was not so remote as to be 
negligible).   
219. Id. at 394. 
220. See id. at 394–95 (explaining how Mr. Graev’s insistence on 
the side letter showed his ability to foresee the IRS denying deductibility). 
221. See id. at 395 (“[Mr. Graev] did not ‘disregard’ or ‘ignore’ 
it, . . . but rather went out of his way to address it and hedge against it.”). 
222. See id. (asserting that the IRS Notice indicated increased IRS 
scrutiny to all conservation easements).  
223. See id. (emphasizing that the IRS Notice was a general 
warning against “improperly claiming charitable contribution deductions”). 
224. See id. at 395–96 (asserting Mr. Graev’s email to NAT 
requesting a side letter indicates Mr. Graev’s understanding that the deduction 
could be disallowed).  
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so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard.225 It also simultaneously 
destroyed Mr. Graev’s chances at meeting the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard.226 Mr. Graev wanted the side letter to ensure 
that he would not be harmed as a result of his transaction with 
NAT.227 At the same time, the fact that he wanted this letter 
shows that IRS disallowance of the deduction was a possibility.228 
“[T]he risk that his corresponding deductions might be disallowed 
could not be (and was not) ‘ignored with reasonable safety in 
undertaking a serious business transaction.’”229 The fact that 
NAT issued these side letters as a matter of standard policy also 
shows that the grantee, not just the grantor, saw the 
disallowance of the deduction as a non-negligible risk.230 
After establishing the disallowance of the deduction was 
more than so remote as to be negligible, the court then addressed 
NAT’s reliability to its promise if the condition was satisfied.231 
Essentially, the court then asked if NAT could be expected to 
promptly refund Mr. Graev in light of a disallowance.232 The court 
believed that NAT would refund because along with the promise 
made in the side letter, the easement deed included a clause 
which allowed for NAT to abandon the easement.233 This is 
similar to the language seen in Simmons.234 Because the side 
letter represented an ability to act upon that right to abandon, 
the letter itself could be included as a part of the conservation 
                                                 
225. See id. at 404–05 (discussing the role of the side letter in 
triggering the application of the standard).  
226. See id. (noting that “the possibility that NAT would actually 
abandon its rights was more than negligible”).  
227. See id. at 398 (discussing the motives behind the side letter 
and its purposes).  
228. See id. (“The very essence of a comfort letter implies a non-
negligible risk.”). 
229. Id. (citing 885 Inv. Co. v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 156, 161 (1990)). 
230. See id. (highlighting that it was standard policy for NAT to 
issue comfort letters to its donors).  
231. See id. at 401 (assessing whether NAT would uphold the terms 
of its side letter to Mr. Graev).  
232. See id. (analyzing whether or not the refund could be 
anticipated if the IRS disallowed the deduction).  
233. See id. at 404 (holding that NAT would uphold the terms of the 
side letter because the “subscribed and recorded deed . . . reserved for NAT the 
power to do so”). 
234. See Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 




easement.235 The court even argued that NAT would uphold its 
promise to refund if the side letter was found to be 
unenforceable.236 Regardless of this letter’s enforceability, NAT 
would voluntarily return the easement in the case of 
disallowance, and Mr. Graev would not have to make any 
affirmative actions to get his property returned to him as fee 
simple interest.237 The court found that there was no “non-
negligible possibility” that NAT would fail to uphold its promises 
to Mr. Graev.238 According to the Tax Court, both the chance of 
disallowance and the chance of NAT upholding its promises was 
more than negligible, preventing the conditional contribution 
from meeting the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible requirement.239  
 Mr. Graev did try to mitigate the strength of the side 
letter by relying on Commissioner v. Procter.240 He attempted to 
argue that the side letter was unenforceable as a result of 
Procter.241 On its face, this 1944 case from the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit appears to be a corollary to Graev.242 The 
donor in Procter assigned his children remainder interests in two 
trusts, and these children were to receive their interests upon the 
death of the donor’s grandmother.243 The condition at issue in 
Procter was if a “federal court of last resort” determined that any 
part of the transfer in trust was subject to the gift tax, then that 
                                                 
235. See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 405–06 (explaining why 
the side letter can be considered a part of the conservation easement 
agreement).  
236. See id. at 408–09 (describing NAT’s willingness to voluntarily 
remove the easement and interest in upholding its professional reputation).  
237. See id. at 409 (“To decide that there was no non-negligible 
possibility that NAT would voluntarily extinguish the easement and return the 
cash would require us to find that, in order to induce Mr. Graev to make his 
contributions, NAT made cynical promises that it fully intended to break. Our 
record will not support such a finding . . . .”). 
238. See id. (evaluating NAT’s ability to uphold the easement).  
239. See id. (explaining how the actions of NAT and the side letter 
itself establish that the condition did not meet the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard).  
240. See id. at 406 (discussing Mr. Graev’s use of Comm’r v. Procter, 
142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944)). 
241. See id. (noting how Mr. Graev attempts to use Procter to 
invalidate the side letter). 
242. See Comm’r v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824, 827 (4th Cir. 1944) 
(discussing why the terms of the transfer could not avoid the gift tax). 
243. See id. at 825 (explaining the terms of the trust).  
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transfer would not occur.244 This case is similar to Graev in that 
both conditions require the actions of parties outside of the 
grantor/grantee relationship and hinge on tax consequences.245 
The Procter court rejected this condition for three different public 
policy reasons: (1) it discouraged the collection of the gift tax 
because attempts to enforce the tax would only inhibit collection 
of the tax; (2) it would “obstruct the administration of justice by 
requiring the courts to pass upon a moot case” in order to 
maintain the gift tax; and (3) the final judgment of the court 
under this condition would merely undo the gifts and 
subsequently, the judgment of the court itself to assess gift tax.246 
 The Graev court specifically defeated all three of these 
policy reasons in the context of Mr. Graev’s condition.247 
Addressing the first reason, the court stated that the conditions 
in the NAT side letter would not prevent the collection of tax.248 
Instead, the side letter allowed for a restoration to status quo, 
hardly creating a discouragement for the grantor.249 The court 
defeated the second reason by noting the reversion to the grantor 
would not defeat the court’s holding like it would in Procter.250 
Mr. Graev was merely prevented from taking the deduction.251 He 
would not be able to escape tax liability altogether as a result of 
the IRS’s decision.252 Similarly, the Graev court defeated the third 
Procter reason by stating the reversion of the property as a result 
of the side letter would not inherently reverse the judgment of 
                                                 
244. See id. at 827 (describing the condition provided in the trust).  
245. Compare Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 397, 394–95 (2013) 
(outlining the role of a potential disallowance of the deduction in determining 
the outcome) with Procter, 142 F.2d at 825 (4th Cir. 1944) (commenting on the 
role of the court as a third-party in determining the validity of the transaction). 
246. See Procter, 142 F.2d at 827–28 (asserting why the condition is 
invalid on public policy grounds).  
247. See Graev, 140 T.C. at 406–08 (providing an explanation as to 
why the Procter reasoning does not apply the side letter).  
248. See id. at 406–407 (arguing that the side letter would not 
prevent the collection of tax).  
249. See id. at 407 (explaining how the side letter’s condition would 
not contradict a holding to either allow or disallow a deduction).  
250. See id. (“However, in this case, unlike Procter, the reversion to 
the donor would not be inconsistent with the court’s holding . . . .”). 
251. See id. at 409 (explaining that the deduction was disallowed).  





the IRS.253 The IRS denial of a deduction would still operate 
regardless of the reversion of the façade easement to Mr. 
Graev.254  
 Mr. Graev’s use of Procter to argue the side letter was 
unenforceable is puzzling. He initially insisted on the side 
letter.255 Even after NAT offered to withdraw the offer of the side 
letter to potentially preserve the deduction, Mr. Graev chose to 
keep the side letter as a part of the agreement.256 His about-face 
arguing the letter unenforceable eliminates any reasoning as to 
why he insisted on the side letter in the first place.257 This switch 
appears to highlight Mr. Graev’s sole concern of tax 
deductibility.258 If the side letter were rendered unenforceable, it 
would eliminate the tax deduction condition evaluated under the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard.259 But by drawing a 
corollary between Procter and his own case, he only highlights 
that his motivations were similar to the grantors in Procter: he 
wanted the best tax situation possible.260 
 With this Procter corollary denied, the court concluded 
that “there was a substantial possibility that the IRS would 
challenge Graev’s conservation easement deductions.”261 This 
denial of deductions was likely because the IRS was on 
                                                 
253. See id. at 408 (explaining why the situation in Graev does not 
match up with the third policy rationale from Procter).  
254. See id. (noting the return of the easement “would have no 
effect on the Graevs’ tax liabilities”). 
255. See id. at 383 (requesting the side letter).  
256. See id. at 386 (noting that Mr. Graev chose to keep the side 
letter after NAT offered to rescind it).  
257. See id. at 401 (“The Graevs argue, however, that as a matter of 
law NAT could not be held to the promises it made in its side letter”).  
258. See id. (suggesting that Mr. Graev is principally concerned 
with the tax consequences of the transaction).  
259. See id. at 402–03 (explaining Graev’s argument, which was 
that the side letter was unenforceable and his contributions were not 
conditional as a result).  
260. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Graev: Conditional Façade Easement, 
140 TAX NOTES 1607, 1609 (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2333211 (“It is ironic that 
the taxpayers in Graev cited to Procter to sustain their position. If anything, the 
facts in Graev reflect the very behavior so repugnant to the Procter court.”) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT).  
261. See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 409 (2013) (opining on the 
likely IRS treatment of the deduction).  
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heightened notice of abusive claims for conservation easement 
deductions, the condition was solely dependent upon tax 
consequences, and the court found that NAT was very likely to 
satisfy the condition of the side letter if the deduction was 
denied.262  
 
VI. Lessons from Graev v. Commissioner 
 
Within the scope of the existing cases that examine the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard, Graev was the only case 
which used a document outside of the conservation easement 
agreement to establish the condition, and the condition itself 
focused solely on tax consequences.263 Ironically, the side letter 
was meant to protect against disallowance of a deduction, not 
establish a greater likelihood of it occurring.264 This irony raises 
the question of what should a taxpayer do if it wants to get a 
deduction for a conservation easement? This paper argues that in 
order to justify a deduction for the high value conservation 
easements, these donations should be irrevocable based on tax 
consequences. Instead of failing to meet the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard, these conditions should be explicitly 
disallowed in the Treasury Regulations. The possibility of the IRS 
denying a deduction should not be considered a “remote future 
event.”265 
Yet, insisting on irrevocability could weaken the incentive 
system of conservation easements altogether.266 Mr. Graev was 
trying to ensure that his donation was deductible; otherwise it 
seems he would have been unlikely to part with some of his 
ownership rights in the façade.267 Mr. Graev’s extensive efforts to 
                                                 
262. See Gerzog, supra note 260, at 1609 (discussing why the IRS 
disallowed the deduction).  
263. See Graev, 140 T.C. at 383 (outlining the contents of the side 
letter). 
264. See Gerzog, supra note 260, at 1609 (noting the purpose of the 
side letter). 
265. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-1(e), -7(a)(3), -14(g)(3) (2014) 
(explaining that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard is applied when 
conditions rely on future events).  
266. See Gerzog, supra note 260, at 1609 (discussing the 
implications of factoring motive into allowing charitable deductions). 





get the deduction raise the issue of whether blatantly seeking out 
tax deductions is a sound policy for making charitable 
contributions.268 Laura Gerzog’s review of Graev acknowledges 
that most people donate to charity in hopes that their donation 
creates a deduction.269 This desire encourages taxpayers like Mr. 
Graev to seek out opportunities for revocable donations based on 
deductibility.270 This revocability creates “tax insurance” for the 
grantor.271 A “tax insurance” system for qualified conservation 
contributions would encourage grantors to place aggressive 
valuations on their easements because they would only be 
returned to the status quo if the deductions were denied.272 This 
low risk of loss would encourage grantors to make qualified 
conservation contributions, but this low risk of loss would only 
continue to perpetuate the problems with conservation easements 
today including overvaluation.273 
An allowance for revocable donations based on 
deductibility would create further inefficiencies to the charitable 
contribution system.274 If there were a surge of these conditional 
donations, charities would be subject to the decisions of the IRS 
and unable to fully utilize the property until the IRS had decided 
on the deduction or the statute of limitations period ran out.275 If 
deductibility were contested, then the charitable organizations 
may also feel obligated to support the taxpayer in litigation in 
order to preserve the charitable gift they now hold.276 Lastly, to 
                                                 
268. See Gerzog, supra note 260, at 1609 (questioning the prudence 
of the current policy on charitable deductions).  
269. See id. (explaining the policy rationale behind conditioning 
donations based on deductibility). 
270. See Remarks of Steven T. Miller, supra note 8 (commenting on 
the misuse of revocable donations). 
271. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
272. See Remarks of Steven T. Miller, supra note 8 (discussing the 
propensity of taxpayers to overvalue easements).  
273. See id. (highlighting valuation as one of the problems with 
qualified conservation contributions).  
274. See Gerzog, supra note 260, at 1609 (implying that allowing 
donors to alter donations after the IRS disallowed a deduction would be 
undesirable).  
275. See id. (explaining that charities “would not know if they were 
receiving funds and could not rely on using those ‘donations’ until several years 
into the future”). 
276. See id. (“If all charitable gifts were conditional on receiving a 
tax deduction, that limitation would place a heavy burden on charities.”).  
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allow revocability based on tax deductions for conservation 
easements would continue to expand the perpetuity issues 
surrounding conservation easements.277 The easement would be 
unable to exist in perpetuity until the issue of deductibility was 
resolved, and the original legislative purpose of conserving land 
for the public benefit would be diminished.278 Instead, the private 
benefit of the taxpayer would surpass the public benefit.279 
 Irrevocability on the other hand would force qualified 
conservation contributions subject to deductibility conditions to 
focus on conditions related to conservation in perpetuity. In 
establishing the risk that the contribution may not be deductible, 
grantors would be less aggressive in valuation and would be more 
likely to have the “donative intent . . . central to allowing a 
charitable deduction.”280 The burden on the taxpayer as a result 
of overvalued conservation easements may decrease with less 
aggressive transactions.281 The insistence upon irrevocability for 
tax purposes would also allow for a more concise definition of the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard.282 The Graev case 
highlighted the circular nature of a tax dependent condition: by 
focusing solely on deductibility, the issue became more than 
negligible thereby eliminating the possibility for a deduction.283 
Excluding revocable, tax dependent conditions would help bring 
the focus so-remote-as-to-be-negligible analysis back to the ability 
                                                 
277. See generally Jay, supra note 36 (addressing the perpetuity 
issues with conservation easements particularly related to subsequent changes 
to the easement).  
278. See S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 9 (1980) (explaining the importance 
of conservation U.S. “natural resources and cultural heritage”).  
279. See Sims, supra note 21, at 753 (acknowledging that many 
conservation easements benefit the grantor more than the public).  
280. See Gerzog, supra note 260 at 1609 (citing United States v. 
American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117–18 (1986)) (explaining the key 
component of a charitable deduction).  
281. See Sims, supra note 21, at 729 (noting that the taxpaying 
public suffers the costs from overvalued conservation easements).  
282. See id. at 764 (commenting on the requirements for perpetual 
conservation restrictions).  
283. See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 401 (2013) (“Given that 
non-negligible risk, Mr. Graev's contributions fell afoul of the section 170 
regulations implementing the statutory requirements that a gift be effectively 
‘made’, that it consist of an ‘entire interest’, and that it be a ‘qualified 








The so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard applied to 
qualified conservation contributions is only defined by case law, 
and as a result, has been applied broadly and inconsistently.285 
Its original use in estate tax issues emphasized that reviewing 
courts should focus on whether the grantee charity will be able to 
take as a result of the condition.286 If the possibility of the charity 
not taking was so remote as to be negligible, then a deduction 
would be allowed for the charitable contribution.287  
While federal income tax cases used the definitions of the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard supplied from its estate 
tax predecessors, the courts also began evaluating the role of the 
grantor under the standard.288 Deductibility not only depended on 
the grantee’s ability to maintain the easement.289 It also 
depended upon the grantor’s donative commitment to the 
easement.290 Evidence of a grantor seeking an easy refund, as 
opposed to a commitment to conservation, convinced courts to 
deny deductions.291 
Graev v. Commissioner confused things because the 
condition subject to the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard 
                                                 
284. See Comm’r v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 194 (1955) 
(discussing the underlying purpose of the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard  
is to ensure that if a taxpayer gets a deduction, the charity will take also).  
285. See Graev, 140 T.C. at 393–94 (outlining precedent relevant to 
the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard). 
286. See id. (“The “so remote as to be negligible” phrase is the 
familiar term first used in the 1949 estate tax regulations . . . .”).  
287. See id. (explaining how the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard developed).  
288. See Briggs v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 646, 659 (1979) (noting the 
importance of the grantor’s desire in making the gift).  
289. See id. at 657–58 (discussing the grantee’s ability to comply 
with the conditions of the gift).   
290. See id. at 659 (looking to the donor’s ultimate intent in 
determining the allowance of the deduction).  
291. See generally id. (explaining the grantor’s intention to take 
back the property if the grantee failed to carry out the condition); Graev, 140 
T.C. 377 (2013) (emphasizing Mr. Graev’s primary desire to have a tax 
deduction).  
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related solely to deductibility.292 The court did not even address 
the grantor or grantee’s ability to maintain the easement because 
the condition had nothing to do with the property itself.293 The 
Tax Court found that the deduction should be denied under the 
so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard.294 Because of heightened 
IRS scrutiny, the court reasoned the denial of the deduction to be 
more than negligible.295 Also, the grantor’s efforts to preserve the 
deduction only highlighted that his concern about a greater than 
negligible chance that the deduction for the easement would be 
denied.296 
The situation present in Graev raises the issue as to 
whether the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard and 
conditions for remote future events should be permitted when the 
condition is focused solely on deductibility.297 These conditions 
seem to benefit the grantor taxpayer, not to the public.298 Because 
these tax insurance conditions seem to extract any sort of 
altruistic donative intent from the transaction, the Treasury 
should promulgate regulations that prohibit revocability of the 
donations on the grounds of a denial of deduction.  
 
 
                                                 
292. See Graev, 140 T.C. at 401–02 (2013) (analyzing the possibility 
of a return of the contribution). 
293. See id. at 408 (reviewing the terms of the easement). 
294. See id. at 409 (explaining the court’s conclusions). 
295. See id. at 397 (discussing the increased IRS scrutiny of these 
transactions). 
296. See id. (commenting on Mr. Graev’s concerns with the 
deductibility of the easement and his subsequent actions).  
297. See id. at 394 (“What is determinative under the section 170 
‘remote’ regulations is the possibility, after considering all the facts and 
circumstances, that NAT's reception and retention of the easement and cash 
would be defeated”). 
298. See Gerzog, supra note 260, at 1609 (implying that permitting 
gifts to be conditioned on deductibility is not sound public policy).  
